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Abstract
American war reporting today, specifically in the Iraq War, differs in many ways from
past American military conflicts - not only in technology available to repOliers, but in
today's reporting philosophies. This thesis maintains that, for war reporters, "objective
coverage" is essentially impossible. To support this claim, the thesis examines war
reporting historically in the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, and the Iraq War. The
thesis also studies the oft-tumultuous relationship between the troops and the press and
analyzes the struggles of war correspondents in maintaining objectivity as they dealt with
internal conflict and external censorship.
Finally, the thesis presents interviews of five reporters from differing media
backgrounds - all of whom were embedded with the troops in Iraq. The interviewees'
overarching opinions were that coverage was unrestricted by the military but that true
openness about the coverage was unattainable. They all agreed that their objectivity was
unaffected.
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Embedding: A Brief Historical Overview and Contemporary Analysis of Journalists'
External and Internal Struggles with War Reporting
Introduction
The current American military presence in Iraq is by no measure unquestioned by
Americans stateside, including journalists and pundits on national media outlets who
discuss the war ad nauseam. The primary way the American people assimilate news
about the war is through their particular flavor of news media, which, depending on its
creed, may expressly or implicitly support one agenda over another. The major way that
national news networks communicate the most up-to-date information possible, whether
through next-day newspaper reports, live television broadcasts or blogs from the
battlefield, is through the embedded reporter. Embedding, which is the process of media
outlets and military units cooperating to plant a reporter within a battalion of troops in
order to report on military conflict, is relatively new as an organized entity. However, it
has much basis in the history of war correspondence, mostly resulting from the Vietnam
conflict and the Persian Gulf War, and it may be in part a response to history, insofar as it
relates to the relationship between the media and the military and the evolving
philosophies of reporting on military conflict.
Historical Overview of War Correspondence

Vietnam War
Knightley (1975) states that the Vietnam War (hereafter "War") was the first
American military conflict in which war reporters started to have reservations about the
morality of their profession in wartime. In addition, David Halberstam (1979) explains
that reporters were not necessarily affected so much by their attempts to put together an
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honest depiction of the War as they were by their editors' attempts to stomach the
unfavorable reports of American exploits. Questions surfaced for the reporters, both
about the amount of nationalism that was relative to fair coverage and about how
reporters were personally and professionally altered by the War. Herbert J. Gans details
the anecdote of a veteran war correspondent in Vietnam to strengthen this point. The
reporter said this about how the War began to affect him and his coverage: "[You] get
caught up, you are involved with the people you are with-the GI's-not with the people
being killed or the civilians, but the GI's and you can't help that" (Gans, 1979, p. 135).
Gans also mentions the "symbiotic relationships" that members of the media had early on
in the War, in which reporters from Washington fed the military's take on the progress of
the War and information from the War to their publications (Gans, 1979). He later
suggests that this early flow of information was because Americans perceived the War as
a South Vietnamese domestic conflict, which influenced the reporters' ideology at first
(Gans, 1979).
However, after the horror and failure of the Tet offensive in 1968, news bureaus
sent their top brass from Washington to assess the situation. Tet, a startling turn of events
in the War in which North Vietnamese soldiers went on the offensive on January 31,
1968, in the urban areas of South Vietnam, wrought unforeseen bloodshed in the streets
of Saigon (Karnow, 1983). As a result of the efforts of the North Vietnamese, those
senior editors almost unanimously began to express serious doubt in their editorial
remarks about whether the war was winnable (Gans, 1979). The most prominent of these
news leaders was CBS anchor Walter Cronkite, who reversed his opinion after seeing the
fallout from Tet and the hardiness of the North Vietnamese army (Graber, 1984).
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Cronkite originally supported the war and even used his influence to advance the pro-war
rhetoric because of his trust in public officials, but he found that he could not continue
this course of action after Tet - and his changed attitude was a barometer of the climate
of American public opinion (Graber, 1984). Even so, in his personal assessment of the
Vietnam conflict as part of a CBS special report in late February, 1968, Cronkite
displayed a trace amount of the resilience that he had once held concerning the War:
It seems now more certain than ever that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to

end in a stalemate .... (To) say that we are closer to victory today is to believe, in
the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To
suggest that we are on the edge of defeat is to yield to unreasonable pessimism.
To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory,
conclusion. (Spector, 1993, p. ix)
Because of his assessment, Cronkite may have heavily influenced the next presidential
election, for it was while watching the Cronkite broadcast that then-President Lyndon
Baines Johnson, already under pressure from a friend not to accept his party's nomination
for the 1968 election, told his press secretary, George Christian, that if he had lost the
support of Walter Cronkite, then he had lost "Mr. Average Citizen" (Graber, 1984).
Indeed, that CBS broadcast was a watershed for the American media - it marked the first
time in history that an American war was "called" by one of their own (Graber, 1984).
In terms of media used to report on the war, television played perhaps the most
major role in communicating the Vietnam conflict to the American people - and it did
not hurt that reporters had virtually free reign in Vietnam because of a permissive
military policy. The impact of the glut of television coverage is amply demonstrated by
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two corresponding facts, both of which have been universally corroborated. First, the
Vietnam War era was the first large-scale American military venture in which enough
televisions were present in America to make televised reporting a force (100 million sets
at the peak of the War) (Knightley, 1975). Second, the primary way a majority of
Americans, 60% to be precise, received news about the war was through their television
sets (Knightley, 1975). Thus, television has been deemed the vehicle that most
powerfully drove Americans' views on the War.
Much of the opinion surrounding television documentation of the Vietnam War
tends to view the medium as turning the conflict into a "living-room war," a war that was
not lost in the jungles of Indochina or the streets of Hanoi and Saigon but in the minds
and hearts of the American people through what their eyes witnessed on a daily basis.
This view partially casts the breadth of television coverage in a bad light from the
perspective of the government in that allowing cameras to present a naked and graphic
portrayal of the War highly influenced the affections and opinions of stateside Americans
to turn against the war effort, thus significantly lessening the popUlarity of and support
for the War. In his book, The Powers That Be, Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist David
Halberstam (1979) lends strong support to such a characterization of television in the
Vietnam years, and he states that, at first, the portrayal of the American offensive on the
small screen made the debate surrounding the war and the troops seem unimportant.
However, the war was never unimportant to the journalists who covered it. As far
as the pro-war versus anti-war stance, Halberstam (1979) contends that, early on in their
coverage, news networks were nationalistic almost without fail, taking for granted the
perceived rightness of the American cause, and anti-war voices were treated with distaste
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- in short, television was "very much on the team." Still, he says, there were two major
factors that compelled the American consensus to turn against the war. First, the length of
the war - because of the nature of the involvement of the NOlih Vietnamese, who could
control the pace of the war on their terms - worked against Washington bureaucrats' idea
of a "quick fix" and thus proved them to be wrong (Halberstam, 1979). Second, the fact
that this particular war - one that made no distinction between civilian and soldier - was
televised in all of its dragged-out brutality contributed greatly to its rejection by the
American people (Halberstam, 1979).

In addition, Halberstam asserted in a March, 1964, lecture at the Columbia
Graduate School of Journalism that, early on in the Vietnam War, journalists were
instrumental in modifying the U.S. government's policy concerning Vietnam
(Hohenberg, 1964). He did admit, however, that he and his fellow journalists were
"sympathetic" towards the U.S. government's involvement with Saigon (Hohenberg,
1964). Even so, Halberstam maintained his opinion that the war correspondents he was
working with were able to maintain an objective position on the matter because of their
critical assessment of what they perceived as the undue optimism of their government
with respect to the war (Hohenberg, 1964).
Another historian with an opinion similar to Halberstam is John Hohenberg. In
the analysis of his chronicle of wartime correspondents, Hohenberg (1964) postulates that
wartime journalists are able to exercise their positions to bring about a type of diplomacy.
At the time that Hohenberg (1964) wrote his synopsis of war reporting, he said that the
Vietnam conflict was yet another demonstration of this unique role of the press. Through
their ability to shape news, he said, the foreign correspondents contributed greatly to and
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sometimes became part of an international diplomatic corps, changing public opinion on
contemporary international news (Hohenberg, 1964).
However, British historian Philip Knightley partially disputes this claim. He
provides evidence to suggest that the constant barrage of war footage in the 1960s and
1970s, rather than functioning to shift public opinion on the War, only served to reinforce
Americans' existing preconceptions about the War. One possible effect of this
reinforcement was a deadening of the American psyche to the rawness of war. Knightley
(1975) believes that because of the "small-box" nature of television coverage, the War
seemed almost surreal and cinema-like to Americans, and that even the enduring opinion
of the War has come to entail mostly combat footage that does not truly express the full
scope of the War.
In analyzing the effects of the televised broadcasting of the Vietnam War on the

American populace, American psychologist Fredric Wertham said in 1967 that television
"had the effect of conditioning its audience to accept war" (Knightley, 1975, p. 411). In
addition, a Newsweek survey five years later arrived at nearly the same conclusion. "The
only way we can possibly tolerate it is by turning off a part of ourselves instead of the
television set," Newsweek reported (Knightley, 1975, pp. 411-12). Knightley (1975) also
cites statistics on the number of correspondents in Vietnam to show two other effects that
the Tet offensive - specifically, the My Lai massacre on March 16, 1968 - had on the
American media's perception of the war: 1) a general, if resigned, agreement that the
U.S. had all but lost the War and 2) the fact that increasingly declining space was given
to coverage of the War after My Lai, a brutal incident in which U.S. soldiers slaughtered
more than 300 peasants in a coastal Vietnamese province (Karnow, 1983).

Embedding 10
To complicate matters, some war correspondents in the Vietnam conflict were
subjected to duties that were well outside the scope of their resumes. In the bestselling
chronicle We Were Soldiers Once ... and Young, United Press International reporter Joe
Galloway recounts an incident that blurred the lines between combatant and observer
(Moore, 1993). Galloway says that, during the beginning stages of the Battle of Ia Drang
in November, 1965, Major Charles Beckwith, the commanding officer of the Plei Me
Special Forces Camp, handed him an M-16 rifle after the fight concluded (Moore, 1993).
Galloway protested that, per the Geneva convention, he had to be considered a civilian
and a noncombatant, to which Beckwith responded, "No such thing in these mountains,
boy. Take the rifle" (Moore, 1993, p. 36).
The Vietnam War is identified as the first American overseas military venture in
which the U.S. government placed virtually no restrictions on the amount of information
to which it allowed the American media access. Indeed, the virtually uncensored
characteristic of the Vietnam War gave the media all they needed to report on it in all of
its ghastly detail, night after night. Daniel Hallin, a political science and communications
professor at the University of California at Berkeley, points out the stark contrast between
the media's role in the Vietnam era and its role in earlier historical periods. Hallin (1986)
says that, in previous wars, the American press had functioned essentially as a "fourth
branch of government," a public relations mouthpiece for the political establishment of
the time. As part of this duty, the press gave up its right to criticize the government's
wartime policy; in addition, the press had to allow government to shape the news
according to its foreign policy dictates (Hallin, 1986).
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Despite this entanglement with the affairs of its government, the members of the
American press slowly began to extricate themselves from the clutches of government via
the unrestricted current of war news (Hallin, 1986). Because the circumstances
surrounding the media/military relationship in the War differed significantly from the
circumstances in World War II, the previous censorship barrier that existed for reporters
was basically lifted. The open flow of news was an aspect of the war that Hallin (1986)
argues could not be controlled by the military because, for the U.S. government,
censoring the reporters in Vietnam would have been politically unreasonable because
American military units were functioning as visitors in South Vietnam.
Another area that the shift in military censorship in Vietnam affected, Hallin
contends, was the tone of news stories and the American public's perception of those
stories. To offer an illustration of this drastic change, Hallin explains, one should
examine the facts of the differing perspectives of World War II stories and Vietnam
dispatches. World War II stories were crafted in such a way as to seem to be speaking
from the individual experiences of the journalists - the sources for those journalists, if
they were mentioned at all, were buried somewhere in the stories, giving the appearance
of personal testimonies (Hallin, 1986). Ostensibly, this characteristic of the dispatches
allowed the reader to feel more personally involved, and the shared meaning that resulted
made the reader more trusting of the journalist and the cause of the war. On the other
hand, the unrestrained nature of the news from Vietnam made the reporter look more
detached from his or her story and the "war effort" (Hallin, 1986). Hallin (1986) says that
the Vietnam stories were "peppered with attributions" that were sometimes conflicting,
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but these attributions were seasonings that caused the story to become less pleasant to the
reader, thus also creating a sense of detachment inside the reader.
Vietnam, then, was an open war, in which the American military exercised little
or no restraints on the amount of information to which it allowed repOliers access. As an
example of this action, consider the experience of Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore,
also of We Were Soldiers fame. Moore (1993) describes his policy with war
correspondents thus in his memoir: "I welcomed visiting reporters to my battalion and,
later, to my brigade. 1 told them they could go anywhere they wanted with my troopers,
with only two restrictions: Don't put out any information that will endanger us, and don't
interfere with operations. 1 never had cause to regret that openness" (p. 157). This
strategy, rather than bring positive benefits to America's armed forces by highlighting
their liberality in sharing details and data with reporters, instead backfired on them by
exposing the unethical nature of some of the soldiers who were fighting and by showing
the drawn-out nature of the war. Military commanders recognized only slowly the havoc
they were wreaking on their campaigns by letting the "uncontrolled" media have an
essentially unrestricted flow of information. Such a policy would not be too soon
repeated in the next major American military endeavor - the Persian Gulf War in 1990
and 1991.

Persian Gulf War
If the Vietnam War was in any way open to reporters, then the Gulf War was

closed and padlocked and the key melted down. It is true that the Gulf War was another
watershed for the American press in that it was the first foreign American military
endeavor to be broadcast in real time (Graber, 2000). In addition, the round-the-clock
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coverage by major news networks created what members of the press termed the "CNN
effect," which was the propensity of the American populace to remain glued to their
television sets for hours so that they would not miss the next development in the Gulf
War (Graber, 2000). However, the censorship that the American media had to accept in
order to reach that momentous point certainly, for them, soured the sweet taste of history
in the making. In his revealing book, Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the

1991 Gulf War, Harper's Magazine publisher John MacArthur (2004) implies that the
political establishment learned its lessons from Vietnam. He also says that, even as the
Gulf War began in August, 1990, then-President George H. W. Bush had no intention of
letting American news networks have the free reign in Kuwait that they did in Vietnam
(MacArthur, 2004). Robert Wiener (2002), a reporter for CNN during the Gulf War,
substantiates this policy shift from the reporter's perspective by expressing bewilderment
at the censorship to which his network was subject. MacArthur (2004) recounts the
history of the governmental memo entitled "Annex Foxtrot" that shaped the limitations
on the coverage of the War. What exactly was Foxtrot's main rule ofreporter/troop
relations? "News media representatives will be escorted at all times. Repeat, at all times"
(MacAlihur, 2004, p. 7).
Despite these restrictions, the American government did give limited accessibility
to the press. One major tool that Bush's administration used to placate members of the
media was the National Media Pool established by the U.S. Department of Defense,
which allowed its members to file even mundane stories (MacArthur, 2004). The DOD
Pool perhaps lulled the journalists figuratively to sleep in that they were happy to file
stories and carry out other tasks common to their reporting while remaining totally
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unaware of their restricted freedom, thus creating a false impression of the way things
were. Long after the War was over, MacArthur (2004) recounts, the New York Times
remarked that the Gulf War was "this century's first major conflict where the policy was
to confine reporters to escorted pools that sharply curtailed when and how they could talk
to the troops" (p. 7).
MacArthur and others list the hindrances to good reporting during the Gulf War
era: military censorship, as evidenced by the 1,600 journalists who had to sit on their
hands in Saudi Arabia; the briefness of the conflict; and the fact that it was mostly an air
campaign (MacArthur, 2004; Graber, 2000). Another obstacle was the "randomness" that
would typify any superior war correspondence, which was a characterization that was
notably absent from the reporting of the Gulf War because of the planned nature of the
information (MacArthur, 2004). An additional obstacle, according to MacArthur (2004),
was whether the Gulf War could even be properly termed a war. He raises this question
by calling into question the characterization of the conflict as a "war" because the term
"war" presumes two sides (the Iraqis put up almost no resistance to the coalition forces),
and he compares the conflict to a massacre (MacArthur, 2004).
Another factor MacArthur (2004) mentions that contributed to the climate of
censorship were the public affairs officers (P AOs), who were those military personnel
whose sole job was to keep a tight lid on military information, both from getting to the
journalists and from slipping out of the soldiers' mouths. Other serious censorship-related
roadblocks to getting the full story about the Gulf War, at least from the reporters'
perspective, included the following: the barring of the press from Dover Air Force Base
in Dover, DE, which is the drop-off point for the flag-draped coffins of American soldiers
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who make the ultimate sacrifice; and the arresting of most of the over-eager reporters
who donned combat clothes to sneak in with the troops, only to be discovered and
incarcerated for up to 12 hours (Graber, 2000).
Because of these difficulties, the Gulf War was easier for the President and his
administration to shape - and, for some odd reason, American media figureheads and
outlets almost unilaterally showed a lack of concern for the fact that their freedom of the
press was being usurped by the government (MacArthur, 2004). Some, such as Dan
Rather of CBS and Katharine Graham of the Washington Post, did speak out
disapprovingly, almost angrily at the limitations (though those instances were after the
fact), but this was far from the norm (MacArthur, 2004). Even so, MacArthur (2004) does
list some notable exceptions to the rule of muzzled reporters, such as CBS reporter Bob
Simon and his staff, who were able to obtain the first "scoop" of the war by dressing in
fatigues and leaving their pool to film a burning Saudi oil refinery, and British
correspondent Robert Fisk, who went unescorted into an Iraqi town in his dogged pursuit
of a good story.
After the Gulf War, however, all four executives of the major news networks of
the time (excluding FOX) and executives from 13 other news organizations presented a
signed report of their grievances over the Bush administration's censorship to thenSecretary of Defense Richard Cheney (Graber, 2000). In the report, the executives
decried the restrictions on military information and essentially called them an affront to
the free press of a democracy (MacArthur, 2004). In addition, the executives criticized
the government for shaping the news to fit its agenda by controlling information that the
executives believed was their legitimate right to print and broadcast restriction-free
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(MacArthur, 2004). Furthermore, the executives denounced the unnecessary delays in
getting copy sent back to their headquar1ers, in which military officers would take extra
time with articles to ensure that stories were properly sanitized of undesirable information
(MacArthur, 2004). Finally, media executives decried the unwanted use of military
escorts for reporter pools, which were described by one cOlTespondent during the war as
"a group of senior citizens on a conducted tour" (MacAl1hur, 2004, pp. 309, 311).

Iraq War
If the Gulf War was a reaction of the U.S. government to its liberality in Vietnam,

then the embedded reporters program in Iraq was, in part, the re-reaction of the press. Bill
Katovsky (2003), in his chronicle of war correspondents in Iraq, Embedded: the Media at

War in Iraq, reminds his readers that the notion of embedding, which he calls a "slick
new public-relations concept," was borrowed from ear'lier American wars (p. xi). By way
of reminder, embedding is a term used to refer to Iraq War reporters who, after enduring
a special "boot camp" that would prepare them for the rigors of the battlefield, were
attached to combat units, having signed agreements not to publish certain information,
such as tactical facts or locations of troop movements. To inaugurate the PR campaign,
the Pentagon issued 2,700 media credentials at the start of what the U.S. Central
Command's Director of Strategic Communications, Jim Wilkerson, observed would be
the "most covered war' in history" (Katovsky, 2003, p. xi). One possible ground for this
assessment of the upcoming war coverage was the ubiquitous nature of technology,
especially technology that would permit war to be broadcast in real time with minimal
restrictions. Whatever the reason, it was apparent that the media outlets and the military,
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which were indeed strange bedfellows, had started a new chapter in their tumultuous
relationship.
Journalists began dividing themselves into ideological camps based on their
journalistic philosophy - the embedded reporter and the independent, which functioned
much like the "unilateral" of the Gulf War days (Katovsky, 2003). Embedded journalists
had vastly more access to the troops and the front lines, as Katovsky (2003) details, and
they were protected from more harm than they would have been if they were freelancing.
However, their points of view were severely restricted to the area of the units with which
they happened to be traveling. Another potential drawback to being embedded was a
possible loss of impartiality because of their close proximity to the troops. However, CBS
News correspondent Bob Schieffer strongly disagrees with this contention. In fact, he
compared the embedded reporters to regular beat reporters who, no matter what kind of a
story they had written, would have to go back to the same people day after day - in the
Iraq journalists' case, the troops (Sylvester, 2005).
Conversely, the independent (hereafter "unilateral") journalist, who was not tied
down to anyone military unit, was able to get a wider range of perspectives and sources
but could not get close to combat (Katovsky, 2004). For the journalist, this represented a
stark moral - and professional - dilemma: is it ethical to trade objectivity for
information? Various journalists addressed this internal conflict in different ways. For
example, CNN Baghdad Bureau Chief Jane AlTaf addressed her own soul-searching in
the midst of the Iraq War (Katovsky, 2004). She said that people who complained that
she had to limit herself in a situation where she decided not to report on specific citizens
in Iraq who had been tortured "did not understand the circumstances of reporting under a
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totalitarian regime" (Katovsky, 2004, p. 64). On the other hand, Ed Timms, a staff writer
for the Washington Bureau of the Dallas Morning News, reported that he faced no
serious ethical conundrums (Sylvester, 2005). Timms, who went through an embedding
boot camp of sorts before his travels in Iraq, said that the work was difficult at times but
said that his actual reporting responsibilities were nevertheless not wearisome in the least,
provided he take into account some commonsense rules such as not showing lights when
the enemy was close by or identifying his unit's specific location (Sylvester, 2005).
Embedded journalists in Iraq are probably the most privileged group of wartime
correspondents ever to be in existence - not only do they get special training beforehand,
the nature of today' s technology is such that so many forms of contemporary media
(blogs, podcasts, online streaming video, webcams, etc.) can be at the fingeliips of the
journalists who need them. Joseph Galloway, the famed Vietnam-era correspondent who
now works for Knight Ridder Newspapers, said that when Knight Ridder sent out 50
reporters (both unilateral and embedded, along with one "combat sketch artist") to Iraq,
every single one of them traveled with a laptop and a satellite telephone in order to send
their work back to the States for editors to process and categorize the information
(Sylvester, 2005).
Since its inception at the start of the war in Iraq, the embed program has received
mixed responses from those involved. Lt. Col. Oliver North's testimony is witness to this
fact. North (2003) praises the reporters in his writings for seeming to provide a
"straightforward account" of the war, and he mentions some instances of American
members of the media appearing to be "genuinely surprised" at the humanitarian efforts
of the troops surrounding them. On the other hand, North (2003) is also critical of the
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American war correspondents in part for what he perceives as distorted or negative
reporting. In contrast, Gen. Tommy Franks finds mostly positive things to say about the
embedded reporters in his book, American Soldier. Franks (2004) writes, "And as the
progress unfolded, it became clear that the traditional distrust and animosity between the
military and the media was breaking down .... There was a certain Ernie Pyle spirit
developing ... " (Franks, 2004, p. 412). He highlights one of the main advantages of the
new system, in that journalists could now have direct access to the front lines of battle,
but he also shows instances in which journalists could not exercise complete freely repOlt
as they desired (operations under cover of night, etc.) (Franks, 2004).

Historical Conclusions
In the final analysis of the embedding process in Iraq, the witnesses of past wars
stand as markers by which that process will inevitably be measured. Especially since the
turmoil occurred in Vietnam, American militaTY ventures on foreign soil have been
occasions for the constant tug-of-war match between the military leaders and the press to
surface. This clash has largely remained external to the reporter in that the conflict is
interpersonal, such as instances when representatives of the media and of the military are
at odds, arguing about how a story should be covered. However, the peculiar, soulsearching nature of the embedding process and the character of its alternative have
magnified another dimension of the old struggle - tension that is internal to the reporter.
As previously stated, the ethical decision that today's war correspondents must make as
to which to emphasize more, maintaining objectivity or getting the scoop on the front
lines, can be difficult at times. Not only do the journalists in question have legitimate
concerns for their safety, and sometimes for their lives, but they must also bear the
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burden of choosing the most ethically acceptable way of representing themselves and the
stories they uncover to the American public.
If the journalist in Iraq chooses the path of the unilateralist and the freelancer,
then he or she will most likely enjoy the freedom to move around the country - within
reason - and the 0ppOliunity to develop stories on the war's side issues, such as the plight
of Iraqi civilians caught in the crossfire, the development of or lack of infrastructure since
President Bush declared major combat operations over in May, 2001, or the inner
workings of Iraq's new system of government. On the other hand, if the Iraq war reporter
decides that the thrills and dangers of combat are too enticing to pass up and he or she
becomes embedded within a battalion, that reporter must then prepare for the worst of
conditions. The embedded correspondent eats, drinks, sleeps and breathes war right along
with the troops. This situation, though it gives access to the front lines, the casualties and
the down-and-diliy aspect of warfare, does not lend itself to objectivity easily. Rather,
attachment to and empathy with the troops of the embedded reporter's assigned battalion,
along with a sense of commonality, can become the emotional consequences for that
reporter - consequences that, for journalists today who value their objectivity above all
else, may not be worth the risk.
Contemporary Analysis
Methodology
Developlnent of Subject Criteria
As the thesis began to be formulated and ideas for its examination of the current
embed process, it became apparent that it would be necessary to contact those who had
personal experience with the topic, namely American repOliers who had been embedded
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with coalition forces. The primary search criteria that were developed for data collection
included: 1) the reporters must be American, 2) they must have been embedded with the
troops fighting in the Iraq War, and 3) they must have spent at least a week in their
embedded state with the military. The author decided after a conference with Dr. Cecil
Kramer, then the chair of the Liberty University Department of Communication Studies,
to confine the number of subjects he would interview to five. Distinctions were not made
with respect to type of medium, branch of service, or demographic characteristics. To
locate interview subjects, the author did a cursory Google search using the keywords
"embed" and "reporter." The process by which the scope of the thesis' interview subjects
was consciously narrowed came in locating reporters who worked for papers in close
proximity to Liberty University. In addition, contact was attempted with repOliers that
were from the author's hometown metropolitan area of Denver, Colorado. Even though
the above sub-criteria were not technically stated in the thesis proposal, the sample that
was able to be collected is still representative of embedded reporters as a whole, based on
the commonalities in several points of the interviewees' experiences.
Develop111ent of Interview Criteria

The primary objective of the interviewing was to ascertain the possible degree of
objectivity in war reporting in Iraq. The author came into the research with no
preconceived notions except one: that objectivity in time of war, in the broadest sense of
the term, is impossible, since each reporter would bring a unique set of experiences and
opinions to any given situation. This question of objectivity was analyzed through a
number of different subjects for the questions, including: proximity to and friendships
developed with the troops, emotions or personal experiences that may have played a part
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in the reporter's "spin" on a particular story, and whether military officials played a part
in denying information to the reporter. The complete list of interview questions can be
found in Appendix A of this thesis.

Contacting the Subjects
After researching the names of several reporters, the author settled upon six that
he would attempt to contact, and he added an extra just in case one of the other five was
unavailable or unwilling to comment. The reporters that were contacted were, in order of
those interviewed: Steffan Tubbs of NewsRadio 850 KOA, a Clear Channel station based
in Denver (Tubbs was actually the inspiration for this project); Charlie Brennan of the

Rocky Mountain News, a daily newspaper that is also based in Denver; Mark Johnson of
the Charlotte Observer, a daily paper in the Charlotte, NC, metropolitan area; Jeremy
Redmon of the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, a daily based in Atlanta, GA; and Louis
Hansen, a reporter for The Virginian-Pilot, a daily newspaper that services the Hampton
Roads area of Virginia. The extra reporter the author contacted, whom he ended up not
interviewing, was Bruce Finley of the Denver-based newspaper, The Denver Post.
Through telephone calls and e-mails, each of the five reporters was eventually contacted
and subjected to a telephone interview. Each interview was approximately 18 minutes in
length.

Data Collection
Data collection was performed through the interviews that were conducted with
the reporters who had previously been embedded. All five interviews were conducted on
an Internet Protocol office phone, utilizing the phone's built-in speakerphone and a
micro-cassette recorder to tape the interviews. Following each interview, the author typed
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up a complete transcript of that interview. The transcripts can be found in Appendix B of
this thesis. The transcripts were then used in analyzing the experiences, thoughts, feelings
and opinions of the reporters who were interviewed.

Results
General Questions
Four of the questions pertained to general statements about the tenure of the
embedded repOliers, such as the length of their stays and the units with which they were
embedded. Three out of the five reporters stayed with the troops for approximately twoand-a-half weeks, while one stayed for two months and another stayed for a combined
total of five months. The units they stayed with were also diverse and included the 4th
Infantry Division, the Army Corps of Engineers, the 82nd Airborne Division, the 276th
Engineer Battalion, the 48th Brigade Combat Team, two military ships (the u.S.S. Teddy

Roosevelt and the U.S.S. San Jacinto) and various military police units and systems
support teams. In addition, the reporters gave varied accounts of their "welcome to Iraq"
experiences, which for all of them was an encounter early on in their reporting experience
when they finally realized that they were "over there," to use World War II terminology.
These experiences included the reporters themselves being involved in combat landings
and Scud missile drills, and one experience included viewing of a pile of battle-damaged
vehicles. Finally, three out of the five reporters surveyed came into some sort of contact
with unilateral journalists. However, one reporter - Jeremy Redmon - defined that term
in a different way than it has been used in this thesis, as he considered reporters who
hopped between attachments to military units to be somewhat unilateral instead of the
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"strictly unattached" criterion that was specified (J. Redmon, personal communication,
February 23,2007).

Objectivity Questions
Regarding disallowance of printing of information by military. When the
journalists were asked if the military ever disallowed them from printing information,
four out of the five gave a negative response. However, all four qualified their response
with a common theme - either some sort of "voluntary censorship" or abiding by
"commonsense rules" that they would have adhered to even if the troops were not
present. These included not revealing items such as troop movements or locations of
armaments, essentially "operational information." Later on in the interviews, some
reporters agreed that there was an accompanying undercurrent of self-preservation that
made it easy to abide by the rules the military laid forth in that the reporters knew that if
they reported on items such as troop advances, weapons placements, ar1d base locations,
they would endanger their own lives as well as the soldiers they were covering. By the
reporters' own assessments, this restriction seemed not to affect their coverage. The one
reporter who gave a positive response to the question of disallowance of printing by the
military was Hansen, who affirmed that he had actually been stripped of his reporting
privileges because of some information he had printed about a battle-damaged Humvee
(L. Hansen, personal communication, February 22, 2007). Therefore, this incident was

not so much an issue of disallowance as one of discipline by the military.

Regarding apprehension over bodily harm. Without exception, all five journalists
gave detailed anecdotes of times they were concerned for their safety on the battlefield.
Redmon gave a particularly striking story as he recounted how a suicide bomber had
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walked into a military mess tent and detonated himself, killing more than a dozen people
and wounding close to 70 (Redmon was about 50 meters away from the blast and was
unharmed). Other stories the journalists gave included narrow escapes from improvised
exploding devices (IEDs), survivals of several mortar attacks, and a near miss from a
rocket-propelled grenade (RPG).
Regarding concerns about maintaining professionalis112. Four out of the five

journalists said that they did not believe that their personal professionalism was
compromised. The one journalist who expressed some concern about maintaining a
professional atmosphere was Brennan, who recounted an incident in which military
personnel had instmcted him that he was a non-combatant and could therefore not cany
firearms (c. Brennan, personal communication, Febmary 16,2007). However, in a
situation after that briefing in which there was imminent danger, a few soldiers offered
Brennan a sidearm for protection. He refused, but the soldiers kept pressing the issue for
a while, insisting that he take the gun, before they decided to drop it. Johnson said he
would have opted for self-preservation in such a situation (M. Johnson, personal
communication, Febmary 16,2007). Redmon echoed this sentiment. However, Tubbs did
not address professionalism quite in the same manner (S. Tubbs, personal
communication, Febmary 9, 2007). Hansen concurred with Tubbs' appraisal of the topic,
in that both men gave insight into how they recognized the impOltance of maintaining ties
with their subjects but also how their professional standards were not compromised.
Regarding deliberately unpublished information. All five journalists professed not

to have had the problem of deliberately not filing copy about information because of their
own self-censorship - Johnson overtly, but the other four in the context of the
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"commonsense rules" that were mentioned in the section on military disallowance of
material to be submitted for publication. The journalists seemed to accept their agreement
with the military as part of the natural order of things as they reported on the battlefield.

Regarding afostering offraternity between the reporters and the troops. All five
reporters said that they did develop some sort of sense of commonality with the troops,
whether it was in the context of an actual friendship, as was the case with Tubbs, or
whether the embed unit was from the reporter's hometown, as was the case with Hansen.
The reporters considered the cultivating of such a bond in such circumstances to be only
natural.

Regarding journalistic objectivity that was affected by proximity to mBitary. All
five reporters said that their journalistic objectivity was unaffected by their closeness to
and relationships with military units. Johnson said that, in his estimation, there was no
such thing as being truly objective. He said that each person who could try to write such
stories would have his or her own set of personal biases and experiences that could
possibly affect his or her coverage. Redmon said that the objective scope of his coverage
was affected somewhat, if only because he was somewhat at the mercy of the military for
finding out certain types of information. He cited an example of trying to talk with an
Iraqi citizen while using an American soldier as a translator - Redmon was concerned
that he was possibly hindered by both the mere presence of the armed military officer and
the reality that his translator, due to his military bias, could possibly filter the Iraqi's
Arabic through his personal concern for his fellow troops.

Regarding whether emotions or personal experience figured into coverage. To
greater or lesser degrees, four out of the five reporters confirmed that some stories they
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had written were at times driven by their emotions. Brennan expressed a certain amount
of dissatisfaction with his copy at times, saying it was a little too "hysterical" for his taste
and adding that he thought that more experience would have assisted him in that area.
Hansen, on the other hand, said that he thought the best stories are those into which
emotion is drawn while paying attention to moving moments. "You can be objective and
passionate at the same time," he said. Johnson was the only one who replied to this
question in the negative, saying that his personal emotions did not affect his coverage.
However, he did write an article that came somewhat from his personal experience on
how rare it was to find a soldier who was "eager for the fight," but this appeared to be
unrelated to the scope of the question.

Conclusions from Interviews
The interviews both confirmed and disconfirmed the author's original assumption
about objectivity, in that it is impossible in the broadest sense of the term. That
assumption was confirmed in statements from Johnson, who believed that there was no
such thing as being truly objective but that reporters - including himself - come to stories
"with our own personal experiences, our own personal biases." The assumption was
disconfirmed by the rest of the interviewees, who believed that their objectivity was not
hindered by any consideration, whether it be their closeness or camaraderie with soldiers
or their consensual pre-embed agreement with military officials.
The author was surprised to discover that the information the journalists
"withheld" was due in part to their instinct for self-preservation, in addition to concerns
about the withdrawal of any fmiher cooperation from the military they might have
received. However, some important insights were gained into the opinions of reporters on
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their coverage and the importance of their work. Indeed, on the whole, the reporters
believed that not only had the embed process been a success in covering the Iraq War
from the overall perspective of the media, but it was also extremely influential in
developing them as journalists and as people.
If this topic were to be researched further, additional questions would need to be
added about the tradeoffs between embedding with a military unit and roaming Iraq
unattached. In addition, the focus would not only be on safety issues but also on the
tradeoffs in completeness of coverage that reporters would have to weigh. Those
tradeoffs were probably the most significant other commonality among the interviewees'
relative satisfaction with their work; in some ways, they felt hindered by their attachment
to the military in that it was difficult for them to widen the scope of their stories beyond
military encounters. It would be fascinating to gain insight from reporters about their
consideration of their options as members of the media, and if they thought that their
coverage was in any way incomplete because of the limitations inherent in traveling with
the troops.
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Appendix A

Embed Questionnaire
How long was your stay?
What unit were you embedded with?
What was your "welcome to Iraq" moment?
Did you interact with any unilateral journalists? Describe that experience.
Did military officials ever disallow you from printing information?
Were you ever concerned for your safety?
Did you ever have any concerns about maintaining professionalism?
Did you ever deliberately hold back information due to concerns about your closeness
with the troops?
Did you ever get a sense of commonality or brotherhood with the troops during your
stay?
In what way was your objectivity affected by your proximity to military units, if at all?
Did your own emotions/experiences ever figure into how you covered a particular story?
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Appendix B

Transcribed Interviews
Interview 1: Steffan Tubbs, NewsRadio 850 KOA

MH: I did a little bit of background research on you, but not much, so my first
couple questions are going to concern the stay itself, and then I'm going to get into a
little bit of your feelings, emotions, opinions as it were, because part of my research
project is to discover the objectivity of embedded reporters because of their
proximity to the troops. So that's going to be part of my interview as well. But first
question, how long was your stay?
ST: My stay was two-and-a-half weeks.

MH: Approximately over what time period was that - what month, year, that sort of
thing?
ST: It was from the beginning of March to about mid-March of last year - 2006.

MH: What unit were you embedded with?
ST: I was mostly embedded with members of the 4th LD. (Infantry Division, Army) out
of FOli Hood, Texas, but would also patrol with military police units, Army Corps of
Engineer units - it just would depend on daily activities, but the majority of the time with
the 4th LD.

MH: Sorry for my silence. I'm furiously writing as well so I can have a little bit of
backup.
ST: That's all right.

MH: What was your "welcome to Iraq" moment?
ST: (laughs) The "welcome to Iraq" moment for me was me combat-landing into Sadaam
- formerly Sadaam International Airport - flying on a military transport. I can't
remember the exact - it was a C - it wasn't a C-130; that was what we took out. I think it
was a - gosh, it was a C-17, I can't remember, but it was a major military transport plane
that we took from Kuwait to Iraq. And that was my absolute "welcome to Baghdad,"
you're flying in and you're doing combat maneuvers to avoid possible surface-to-air
missiles or whatever. So that was when I think I officially realized where I was.

MH: Did it - how long did it take to sink in that you were "here"? I mean, I'm sure
that you as a radio personality, a reporter, you're probably used to going to a lot of
places and seeing a lot of new things - but was there anything surreal about that
moment as you guys touched down and walked into the airport?
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ST: My entire two-and-a-half weeks was one collective surreal moment. It was eye
opening, it was scary, it was - I think at some point, you know, averting bodily injury and
- who knows? - death, I don't know, but it was all suneal. Absolutely - hard to relate to
what's going on in Iraq when you're sitting in a newsroom in the United States,
compared to actually being there and hearing the gunfire, smelling the dust storms, you
know, seeing the remains of roadside bombs and that kind of thing. It all was almost at
times out-of-body, like "this isn't happening to me."

MH: Did you ever interact with any unilateral journalists?
ST: Several times. I had a chance at one point - I remember distinctly talking with Iraqi
journalists. And you know, when you say "Iraqi journalists," well, you know under
Sadaam's regime, these were reporters that celiainly had none of the protections of
freedom of the press that we do here in the United States. And to talk with them and to
hear their perspectives on how it used to be compared to what they could write now, at
that time last year, was fascinating. Some of the just factual reporting that these Iraqi
journalists were going through and then actually being able to publish - had they written
the same thing or an editor allowed them to have published what their words were, you
know, 20 years earlier, they would have probably been beheaded at noon in a town
square area. So talking with the Iraqi journalists really stuck out, but you know, when
you're embedded and you're staying around, at least in the "green zone," you're running
into reporters from around the world, whether it be from Australia, Britain, Germany obviously of global interest, and you get the global coverage.

MH: Can you define "green zone" for the uninitiated?
ST: The green zone is an area where a lot of the diplomatic offices are. The former
Republican Palace, where Sadaam - it was basically considered the Iraqi White House, if
you will. Inside the green zone, you've got hospitals, you've got a lot of, again, the
diplomatic operation going on, state department, Army Corps of Engineers. The green
zone is often considered the safe zone, which is ridiculous, because you're a mortar shell
away from being killed, even in the green zone. But this is a highly fortified, highly
secured area where a lot of the high-ranking officials would be and a lot of important
things would be going on "in theater," so to speak. And on the outside of the green zone,
obviously, is what they consider the "red zone," and that is basically - the green zone is
basically a small fingernail of what is greater Baghdad, and that is, you know, considered
completely the red zone.

MH: Okay - now some questions about your reportage. Did military officials ever
disallow you from printing information?
ST: No .... Short answer, no. We were told, you know, the parameters were, you cannot
give any location where you are - that kind of thing, but you know, there was never
censorship as far as, "Here's what I'm going to write," or, "Here's what I plan to
broadcast," and somebody hearing that and saying, "No, you cannot say this." To me, the
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censorship was all common sense. And really, if there was any censorship, it never
impacted my message that I was getting back out in my reports. I mean, you know, who
cares if you're not allowed to name the specific intersection where you're reporting from.
I mean, nobody in the United States cares anyway. So I found the journalistic freedom to
be quite open, and it was definitely refreshing.

MH: You mentioned talking tongue-in-cheek about the green zone. Were you ever
concerned for your safety over there?
ST: Without question. Every single day, almost every single minute, the reason being and this is my big line that I came back with, and I've told so many people about - in
Iraq, at any given time, you're one well-placed mortar shell away from death, no matter
where you are, no matter if you're in the green zone, red zone, walking on a country road,
driving down a highway, at a marketplace. You know, it's really, especially with all the
killings we've seen in the last year, you know - in a sense, you're almost lucky if you
make it through, especially if you're a journalist and you're trying to get to areas where
the danger's at its apex, or if you're traveling with the military and, you know, you're
part of an embed program, obviously United States coalition force is their target. I mean,
I can go into detail specifically if you want me to as to, you know, the most scary time for
me in a unit that I was with if you want, but I don't know how much detail you want me
to give you.

MH: Yeah, urn, just one or two anecdotes.
ST: One anecdote. Driving in a Humvee convoy along a canal where there had been
several Humvees, U.S. Humvees blown up the previous week. And we drove over a small
bridge over a canal, checking out a bombed-out oil pipeline about five miles away. Drove
over that, and when we came back, we were stopped going over the same bridge because
the bridge that we'd driven over was wired with explosives, and there was a devicewires were sticking out of it - and it had been buried. And we avoided it, driving over it,
but they brought out the bomb squad. They dug it up, they couldn't determine what it
was, and they blew it up, right there in front of us. But, you know, you go, "But for the
grace of God, that could have been me." Now would it have killed me? Would it have
hurt me? Would it have hurt anybody else? Who knows? But the fact that we'd just
driven over that not two hours earlier really makes you go, "Wow, you know, this is not
anything but reality."

MH: Wow. That's incredible. Did you ever have any concerns about maintaining
professionalism?
ST: No. I'm a professional. I was respected, you know. I don't know if you're going to
get into how I was treated by the military - members of the military themselves, but you
know, once you broke the ice and you realized, they realized that I wasn't out to try and
backstab 'em or whatever, Ijust wanted to experience and be the eyes and ears of my
audience and just give them exactly what I was seeing. I was welcomed. I developed
friendships with some of the guys, and I was never - not in any way, no.
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MH: Did you ever deliberately hold back information due to concerns about your
closeness with the troops?
ST: Only the locations, but again, I kind of got into that. It was just kind of understood
that you would not disclose the location. Other than that, no.

MH: Did you ever get a sense of commonality or brotherhood with the troops
during your stay?
ST: Great question. Absolutely. You know - not only among themselves, but let's face it
- as a journalist and you're embedded, you're not armed. And you're the only person
sometimes within, you know, who knows how far, that's unarmed. You definitely have a
respect and almost a sense of needing protection by members of the military that you're
embedded with. Now, does this create a conflict of interest? I think absolutely not. If
you're in a war zone, and the guy next to you has military training and he's also got an
M -16 around his shoulder, I think you feel a hell of a lot better about being out there and
trying to cover what you're covering with that kind of protection. What I experiencedflat out a bunch of good guys, people that I would want to have by me if I were in
uniform and people that I wouldn't mind having a beer with out of that situation.

MH: Do you think that your objectivity was in any way affected by your proximity
to military units?
ST: Objectivity, no - again, realizing that, you know, these people are in a sense keeping
you safe. Some would say maybe you're slanted a little bit because your safety's in their
hands - but objectivity, absolutely not. I reported, when I was there, the good, the bad
and the extreme ugly, because ugly over there is very ugly. But again, I was as objective
as I could possibly be, which is my goal on any story, whether it's in Iraq or here in
Denver or wherever, and just to present the facts. And I think I did a solid job of that.

MH: Last question. Did your own emotions or experiences ever figure into how you
covered a particular story?
ST: Not while I was embedded, but when I returned - and I'll give you another small
anecdote. I became, I would say, as good of friends as you could become with somebody
in two or three days. I met a Colorado soldier who was - I was embedded with his unit,
and had corresponded with him after I returned from Iraq, and we had done a very
successful plan to get soccer balls to kids in Iraq. And this Army captain was killed by an
lED, that I had befriended. He was killed five weeks after I came back, and it was
extremely emotional for me. And I don't know how you could have such feelings for
somebody that you've known only a few days, but his death really emphasized, you
know, just put a face on what was going on in Iraq, and I was very emotional- and I still
am. I mean, we're coming up on a year anniversary, and we've donated now more than,
we're coming up on 30,000 soccer balls to our troops. Ijust don't think there's any way,
unless you don't have a heart to - regardless of how you feel about the war". If you're a
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Republican, Democrat, it doesn't matter. I mean, these are human beings. These are
citizens that are over there - and yeah. I was very emotional and very moved by his
death.

u.s.

MH: Do you have any last comments or questions or anything I might have missed?
ST: The only thing I would say is, there's a lot of talk always about whether or not an
embed program is worth it, or is it good. In this reporter's position, this is crucial to how
we cover what our military is doing. You don't have to be in the back pocket of them,
you don't have to agree with everything they say, and certainly I would challenge, you
know, people over there when I was there and ask tough questions. But how in the world
can we know in a military zone what's really going on and what's the true story if
journalists aren't allowed to cover it?
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Interview 2: Charlie Brennan, Rocky Mountain News

MH: And here we go. Once again, I greatly appreciate your taking the time to do
this with me. (I) can't say how much it means to speak with you, sir. It's really a
privilege.
CB: And let me just be clear - you're recording this?

MH: Yes sir.
CB: Okay. All right, that's fine.

MH: I'm going to ask you a few questions, just generic ones about the length of your
stay and some questions about safety, but I'm also going to ask you some questions
about feelings and emotions that may have played into your coverage of Iraq. First
of all, I did some preliminary research on your stay, and I wasn't able to find exact
figures. How long was your stay?
CB: It was not very long. I was in Kuwait prior to the start of the war for about, I would
say, 10 days or so, and then - 10 days or two weeks, and then I was in Iraq for about the
first week, maybe the first seven or eight days of the war. So it was not very long.

MH: That must have been pretty incredible, because from what you've told me,
from what I understand, you were one of the first people there. Was it pretty
surreal?
CB: Yeah. Well, it was, and one aspect of that was, when I entered Iraq, which was
within 24 hours of the start of the invasion, it was with the belief or the understanding
that we were only going to be going a short distance into Iraq. There was a general who I
was traveling with, and what we were told was that it was going to be a two- or three-day
sort of reconnaissance mission in order for that general to establish whether supplies were
getting where they needed to go, but to our surprise, he just kept going . .(laughs) ... It
was, for two or three days, we didn't turn back and go back down to Kuwait, we just kept
going further and further into Iraq. And it was clear, it became clear that he, that he was
not turning around and that he - I'm sure I don't know this, because I left before he got
there, but I presume that he and the people that I was with probably went all the way to
Baghdad. When I left them, they were quite close to Najaf - N-a-j-a-f. That's about as far
as I got with them, but they kept going. But yeah, to use the word "surreal" - yeah. The
first surreal thing was, "Wait a minute, this isn't just a two- or three-day excursion.
They're not turning around."

MH: What unit were you embedded with?
CB: I was with the 5th Corps - you know, Roman numeral V Corps - which is based out
of Germany. The specific unit of the V Corps that I was assigned to was primarily
charged with supply and support assignments. And that didn't on the face of it sound too
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necessarily sexy to me, but that really put them right in the thick of things, because it
was, I think it was the 3rd Infantry Division was sort of the tip of the spear as far as the
push up toward Baghdad, and the people I was with were basically charged with making
sure the 3rd LD. had - was getting all the supplies they needed. So, we were kind of right
behind them, going up generally toward Baghdad.

MH: What was your "welcome to Iraq" moment?
CB: (laughs) I would guess that my "welcome to Iraq" moment was probably the firstprobably the first Scud drill, back when we were still down in Kuwait. I was stationed,
the soldiers I was with were stationed at what was called Camp Virginia, which was one
of the bases established there in the northern Kuwaiti desert, close to the Iraq border. And
the first time their alarms, the Scud alarms went off, and we had to dive into shelters and
get into, get our masks on and all that as quickly as possible. That was one of the first
moments that I started thinking, "Okay, this is - this is for real." And the funny thing
about it - the funny thing about it was that we had been, you know, all the journalists had
been given stern lectures about how you must be able to get your mask on properly
within 45 seconds or 30 seconds, whatever it was - and it was funny to find that soldiers
there in the shelter who were struggling with this thing more than I was. But yeah, I at the
time was 48 years old. I had never served in the military - I had never even briefly
considered ever serving in the military. So to find myself in a shelter, putting on a gas
mask and surrounded by all these guys with heavy weapons, it was - it was a wakeup
moment.

MH: Did you ever interact with any unilateral journalists?
CB: Let me think - I don't believe so. No. I don't think so.

MH: Did military officials ever disallow you from printing information?
CB: No. That was something that I was interested to see. The only time that I came close
to being censored was more a case of self-censoring, and I'll explain. I had written
something in a story that I had heard in a briefing, and after I wrote it, I looked at my
computer screen and I thought, "I wonder if this would cause them any problems." And it
was a question that would probably go to their security. And so I showed it to a public
affairs officer and asked him if he felt that it would cause any issues, and he said, "I don't
think so, but let me show it to one of our guys in intelligence and see what he says." And
so he showed it to the guy in intelligence, and the guy said, "You know, if you could
leave that out, that would be preferable." So, you know, again that was sort of me
showing it to them - me having my own question about it, showing it to them. And had I
never shown it to them, it would've gone into the paper and - yeah, there was never one
case of censoring up front in which they - they never asked to see copy before it was
filed. And I found that pleasantly surprising.

MH: Were you ever concerned for your safety?
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CB: Yeah. (laughs) Yes, I was. And, you know, this goes to why I was not there very
long. I, at the time I went over there, was newly man·ied - newly remarried, I should say.
And I had a 19-year-old daughter from my first marriage. They were both very
unenthusiastic about me going. And I had said to them, "Don't worry about it, I'll be
fine." And I told them - and I realize now, that this was probably a mistake - but I said to
them that if I found myself in a position of immediate jeopardy that I would bail, that I
would get out. You know, I made that to them as a promise. Once I got over there and
pariicularly, once we got into Iraq, I found that I had absolutely zero ability to control
whether I was in jeopardy or not. And we, we were under, I would say, we were under
attack briefly during the actual invasion and push up toward Najaf. And then once we
reached Najaf, there were a couple occasions in which we had intelligence that said that
we were going, that we were under threat of immediate attack from Iraqi Republican
Guard. That never happened. We never did come under attack from them, but on two
different occasions, we had word that, you know, it could be imminent. And that just
made me realize that I was not in a position where I had any control over my own safety.
And there were times that I saw, literally saw, you know, I saw fear· in the eyes of the
soldiers I was with, and that just made me realize that, if what I said to my family meant
anything at all, then it was time for me to get out. And so I did. It was a tough decision
for me to make because I was there to do a job for my newspaper, but I felt that what I
had promised my wife and my daughter was more impOliant.

MH: It's good that you kept your word.
CB: Yeah.

MH: Did you ever have any concerns about maintaining professionalism?
CB: Boy. I guess I would ask how you mean professionalism.

MH: Maintaining your demeanor around the troops and just, I mean - I'm trying
not to get into a question I'm going to ask later, but, just a professional journalistic
atmosphere as far as ...
CB: Yeah. As a matter of fact, there's one thing I recall now, and I don't know if this
goes to your question, but maybe it does. We were told by the Defense Department that
there were a few rules by which we had to abide in order to participate in the embedding.
One of them was that we were not allowed to carry firearms. And, you know, that was
fine to me because I wouldn't know what to do with a firearm anyway. And there - once
we got into Iraq, the invasion was under way, and we started having, you know, periods
where we felt we might be in imminent jeopardy, soldiers were asking me, a couple
soldiers were asking me to carry - to carry a sidearm. And I said to them, "You know,
there's two problems with that." I told them one is that I'd been told I wasn't allowed to,
and the other thing I told them was that I wouldn't know what to do with it if I had onebecause I've just never had any firearms training of any kind. And they, they pressured
me a little bit, but they essentially, they eventually relented, and I never did have to do
that. Another journalist I was with who was sort of in the same, roughly in the same
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group that I was with, a woman from the Miami Herald, was pressure to do so, so much
that she finally relented and agreed to carry one. So, that would be an example where I
felt that, you know, certain professional issues were being jeopardized - but that's how it
played out for me.

MH: That's exactly what I needed. Did you ever deliberately hold back information
due to your concerns about your closeness with the troops?
CB: Let me think. The only example I can think of is - there was one, I think, sergeant
major who I spent a lot of time with, who sort of, in the brief time I was there, sort of
became a sort of running character in several of my stories. And he was smoking cigars
and didn't want me to put that in any stories because he said his wife would be angry at
him if she read that, because he wasn't supposed to be smoking. But in all honesty, that's
like the only thing I can think of that I might have, just as a descriptive detail, tossed into
a story which I withheld .... You use the word "closeness." I did feel like the guy was
becoming something of a friend, and he was definitely like, you know, protecting me
through my time over there, and I thought that was the least I could do in return. I don't
think that that really compromised my stories in any significant way.

MH: That leads perfectly into my next question. Did you ever get a sense of
commonality or brotherhood with the troops during your stay?
CB: Yes, to the extent that it had been a long time since I had been, like, to camp or been
on a sports team or been on something that was a real sort of, like, guy-heavy
environment, if you know what I mean. And I definitely, there was definitely a sense of
fraternity that developed. And I did very much have the sense all along that if anything
happened, if anything bad happened to these guys, then something bad was likely going
to happen to me. And similarly, if I was to come out of this safely, it was probably going
to depend on them also coming out of it safely. So there was very much a feeling of
affinity and, you know - I wanted things to work out well for them for many reasons,
including the fact that that would probably mean they'd work out well for me too.

MH: In what way was your objectivity affected by your proximity to military units,
if at all?
CB: Well, I don't think that - when you say objectivity, do you mean sort of like with
regards to how I perceived the overall mission, and things like that?

MH: Vh-huh. And also, going back a little bit to the - to the professionalism
question. Were you able to maintain a level head, both sides of the story? And yeah, what you just mentioned as well.
CB: Yeah. I think, you know, probably you would have a very hard time finding a
journalist who would ever say, "Oh, my objectivity was severely compromised - my
objectivity went out the window." Probably few journalists are ever going to admit that,
so the fact that I say that it didn't happen to me - you know, maybe I'm not the best
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judge of that. But I will say that before I went over there, I thought that the war was
probably a bad idea and probably not warranted. And I felt that way the whole time that I
was there, and I felt that way when I got back. And so I can't say that being with them
and being part of this ever affected my own sort of personal view of things. And I do, I
would like to think that anybody reading my stories - this is probably the most important
thing - I don't think anybody reading my stories would've come away with a perception
that I was definitely for the war or against the war. I think I was able to keep that, keep
my own thoughts aside - sort of to the side in writing about it. I hope I was.

MH: Last question. Did your own emotions or experiences ever figure into how you
covered a particular story?
CB: Probably yes, to the degree that with - you know, and again, I was there such a short
time - but I know that on several of the stories that I wrote, I wrote in basically a - I was
basically scared. Either scared by the experience, personally scared by the experience I
was writing about, or a couple times, scared while I was in the course of writing them.
And that's because I'd never been in a war environment before. And, you know, I wish
that I had done a lot more reading of coverage by other journalists from other wars before
I went over there, because certainly I've read a lot more since I've come back. And, you
know, many, many, many - many brave journalists have gone through much worse than I
did and, I think, probably managed to be a little bit more, be a little bit less - I wouldn't
say that my copy was hysterical that I filed when I was over there, but I think, I think
sometimes I was perhaps a little bit too, a little bit more shaken by some of the things I
experienced than I should have been. And I think a veteran war correspondent would
have probably handled the stuff a little bit, with a little bit more -less hysteria. And
again, that's not - that's not really the word I want to use. I don't think this hysteria
comes through in my copy, but I wish that I had been maybe a little - a little bit more
composed myself at the time that I was writing some of these things, because it was just it was all so new to me, and different and scary and ... .I think that if I had had more
experience as a war correspondent, perhaps my copy, the things, the stories that I filed
might have read differently.

MH: All right! That's it.
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Interview 3: Mark Johnson, Charlotte Observer

MH: All right, here we go. First question, Mr. Johnson. How long was your stay?
MJ: It was around two months.

MH: That is on the long end of - from what I've researched. Wow. Why were you
there two whole months?
MJ: You know, we went - went over there, met up with them when they were staging in
Kuwait, and we were in Kuwait for a couple weeks, and then into Iraq. So yeah, there
was a little - a little pre-invasion time, and then just basically stayed with them as they
advanced for a while and things just kind of, you know, settled down a little bit, and it
seemed like it was time to come back.

MH: What unit were you embedded with?
MJ: It's the 82nd Airborne Division.

MH: What was your "welcome to Iraq" moment?
MJ: When we landed at night, in what's called a "combat landing" in a C-130. Combat
landing kind of means it's a very fast nosedive to the airstrip - you know, they hit the
deck, the plane comes to a halt, the ramp goes down, and, you know, it's like out of the
movies. You know, "Move, move, move!" You know, everybody's piling out of this
thing, and it's pitch dark out. The runways, I guess, it was illuminated in some ways for
the pilots - but not like you would expect because they, they didn't want to make targets
for anybody. So, it was just all- it was, you know, it's the middle of the night and just all
these things are happening. You're lugging your gear and getting out of the plane and
trying to stay with your guys and - that was pretty much it. That was a good sensory
overload.

MH: I can imagine. Did you ever interact with any unilateral journalists during
your time in Iraq?
MJ: Only in - only in Kuwait, when we were waiting to embed. I saw some friends in
Kuwait City, but that's - I guess you probably wouldn't qualify that as interaction
because we weren't, you know, out in theater.

MH: That makes sense. Did military officials ever disallow you from printing
information?
MJ: No, but I'll qualify that. We agreed to never disclose what they called "operational
information" - and that is, we would never write about where our unit was going next.
And that's pretty much a common sense thing. They didn't have to argue with us over
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that - I mean, that just seemed pretty logical. That's really the only aspect I can think of,
you know, in which we refrained from writing anything.

MH: Were you ever concerned for your safety over there?
MJ: Yes.

MH: Can you describe one or two anecdotes where you were concerned?
MJ: Well, I mean, you know, we had a couple mortar attacks. We had - there was a - we
had - when I say "we," the unit I was with had secured what appeared to have been some
kind of a school at some point. It was several small, little small one-level buildings. And
a firefight broke out - so that was fairly intense. And - but the one I always tell people,
that the - actually, probably the most scared I was, was riding in a Humvee with a couple
sergeants who really just didn't quite have everything together. And we were trying to
follow a convoy, and it was dark and we kept the lights off because it was dark. And you
couldn't see, and they couldn't see to drive, and we're barreling down the road at 50
miles an hour and I was - I was convinced we were going to end up smashing into
something.

MH: Did you ever have any concerns about maintaining professionalism?
MJ: Not - well, I guess, maintaining professionalism in terms of, like, being able to do
the job, being fair?

MH: Yeah, or just maintaining your professional demeanor as a reporter, say, if you
were handed firearms and you're already in a non-combatant role. Just something
like that, that - were there any situations that would have caused you to maintain
that professional, journalistic attitude?
MJ: You know, we were .... (laughs) We were going to the bathroom in ditches, trying to
keep from being dehydrated, you know, breathing sand all the time. It was - nobody kept
the kind of decorum that you do in a normal setting here. But in terms of - there was
never a situation like you're, like you're mentioning where, you know, if you had to take
a weapon and defend or something like that. I mean, I would have done it, but fortunately
I never, never faced that - I mean, in the time that I was there.

MH: Okay. I was just wondering, because I had another reporter earlier today who
I interviewed, Charlie Brennan of the Denver Post.
MJ: Uh-huh.

MH: No, not the Denver Post, the Rocky Mountain News. I'm sorry, I'm getting my
Denver papers mixed up. He - he had that situation come up, where it was a
challenge to his professionalism, where there was a dangerous spot and he was
offered a sidearm. And he'd already been told by his - it was the military superiors
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or something, that, you know, "You're a noncombatant - you can't have firearms."
And then here comes this soldier offering him - offering him this for protection. He
said, "No, I can't take it." So that was the kind of situation I was alluding to.
MJ: Yeah, and I think that's a fair point of inquiry. Fortunately, you just never - you
know, I think - I think, maybe jokingly somebody offered at some point. But there was
never a situation - it was never during a time when we were in danger, where I might
have seriously considered it.

MH: Okay. Did you ever deliberately hold back information due to your concerns
about your closeness with the troops?
MJ: No. No. In fact, the Humvee ride that I told you about - I wrote a column in which I
referred to the sergeants as "Barney" and "Gomer," and I talked about just what, you
know, what a ride through hell it was. Because what I tried to convey was that - one
thing I tried to get across was, what I - a thing among the things I observed, I observed
some just amazingly impressive things that the Army did, that they were able to do in
such a fast time, and, you know, lots of things. But I also showed the things that were sort
of Army embarrassments, that you know, the sort of things you might think of with any
large bureaucratic organization, but you know, applied to a battlefield setting.

MH: Okay. Did you ever get a sense of commonality or brotherhood with the troops
during your stay?
MJ: Between me and them?

MH: Yes.
MJ : Yeah, a little bit - just in the sense of, you know, we were there and, you know, I
was sleeping in the same tent and/or on the sand, or whatever, and, you know, we're
eating the same MREs, and - that kind of stuff. I think that's - that's just naturaL

MH: Okay. In what way was your objectivity affected by your proximity to military
units, if at all?
MJ: I guess - first, I'd say that I'm, I'm one of these people that believes there's no such
thing as being objective. We all come at things with our own personal experiences, our
own personal biases. So you don't write objective stories - you write fair and balanced
stories. Second, you know, being embedded with a unit - there's, it's just atypical from
what you do like I do, day in day out - state government. You don't - there aren't really
two sides to write. You can't really hop over and ask the Iraqis what they think about that
latest a11illery barrage. So, you know, the stories are just naturally going to have only,
you know, one perspective to them. So that is, that is difficult, in one sense, but my
company - it was Knight-Ridder at that time, it's now McClatchy - did the smart thing,
in that they had lots of embedded reporters. And they would take what we sent in, and
they would do overall reports, including from the different embedded reporters in the
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units, but then also from, you know, people in Baghdad, and people with, you know,
command units - all sorts of things.

MH: Okay. Last question. Did your own emotions or experiences ever figure into
how you covered a particular story?
MJ: No, not in how I covered a story. You know, I think that - I mean, there were very
frustrating, scary times. I mean, you could say maybe that factored into what I did in
terms of, I don't know, seeking cover or how, how willing I was to kind of, you know, be
exposed to risk and that kind of thing. But in terms of what I actually wrote about, I don't
think so. Yeah, I don't know if this would be emotion. I mean, I guess one thing - I wrote
about this and I've talked about this before, I mean - one thing that surprised me was
how rare it was to run into somebody who was eager for the fight. I think, we all know,
you know, the stereotype of the gung-ho soldier, you know, wants to go to battle. But it
was just extraordinarily rare to run into somebody who came close to that. These were,
you know - most of the folks you talked to. And mind you, this is back, this is 2003, this
is, you know, before - this is when there was still a very, you know, a pretty positive
attitude about this. Most of the folks you talked to, they kind of - they just wanted to get
the job done and go home.

MH: Okay. That was all the questions I had for you. Do you have any final
comments, just observations about your experience?
MJ : Yeah, just that it was - it was a great, it was a great system, it was a very smart thing
for everybody, you know. The military got stories told that otherwise would never be
told. I mean, war coverage had too often been antiseptic from, you know, way back and,
and not on the lines, so that was helpful to them. It was helpful to us in that we had access
to the things we hadn't had access to before. And it was helpful to, you know, the readers
and viewers because they were able to see up close what was happening.

MH: Okay. I think that's aU I needed.
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Interview 4: Jeremy Redmon, Atlanta Journal-Constitution

MH: Okay, here we go. The first two questions are going to relate to your
experiences - just sort of a cursory overview. And then the last several questions are
going to relate to specific aspects of that coverage.
JR: Okay.

MH: So, first question is, how long was your stay in Iraq?
JR: By the way, I was just curious how you got my name and number and everything, or
why you figured on interviewing me.

MH: (laughs) Good question. As a part of my preliminary research on whom I could
interview, I basically typed in embedded reporters in a Google search engine and
then I searched for both newspapers from my hometown, which is the Denver metro
area, ...
JR: Right.

MH: And then just papers around - the big ones that I knew like the Charlotte
Observer, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Virginian-Pilot, ...
JR: Right.

MH: Fairly large regional papers around Liberty that would be conducive to that.
So, your name came up on the Richmond Times-Dispatch, and through a little bit
more research I was able to find out that you'd now started working with AJC,
which I understand is a very reputable publication.
JR: All right, go ahead and shoot with your questions.

MH: First question - how long was your stay?
JR: I made three trips to Iraq over the course of five months. The first time, I was there
for five weeks, the second time I was there for ten weeks, and the third time I was there it was roughly six weeks.

MH: Wow. Pretty impressive, given that a lot of journalists only make one trip and
then they call it quits.
JR: I was interested in continuing it. You know, I enjoyed the experience that I had the
first time and the second time, so I kept doing it.

MH: That makes sense. Well, since you made three trips, were you embedded with
the same unit all three times, or did you have different units?
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JR: Three different units. The first time, I was embedded with the Virginia National
Guard Unit. It's the 276th Engineer Battalion based out of Richmond. And the second
and third time I was based with several units, mainly the 48th Brigade Combat Team,
which is based in Georgia - the Georgia National Guard Unit. However, I was also
embedded with a Marine unit that handles personnel recovery and then I was embedded
with a Georgia-based military police unit.

MH: And those last few you mentioned were both the second and the third time?
JR: Correct.

MH: Okay. What was your "welcome to Iraq" moment?
JR: Can you hold on one second? (elevator music plays for a few minutes) Hey, you
there?

MH: Yes sir.
JR: Sorry about that. I had a source call me on a different story, but go ahead with your
questions.

MH: Okay. Third question. What was your "welcome to Iraq" moment?
JR: Why would you - what do you mean by "'welcome to Iraq' moment"? Can you
elaborate?

MH: Yes - the point in time in your - I guess it would probably be your first embed
experience where you realized, "Man, this isn't the United States anymore. I'm
actually here."
JR: Let's see - probably, it was the first night we got there, I think. That would have been
December of 2004. The photographer and I, Dean Hoffmaier, had just put our gear away
in our hooch and we were, you know, looking for a mission to go out on, and the
engineers I was embedded with said that they had just gotten a call about an improvised
explosive device, or a suspected one, in the middle of the street in Mosul, which is a town
in northern Iraq - it's the third largest city in Iraq. And so the very night we arrived with
our unit that we were embedded with, we went out that night with the - with that unit,
and they had spotted this suspicious-looking bag in the middle of the street, and we were
with them. I remember standing in the middle of the street that night in downtown Mosul,
thinking, "Yeah, I finally have arrived. I'm in Iraq." It was an intense situation because
they weren't sure if this was an actual device that insurgents had planted. And they used a
robot to go up to it and place some plastic explosives on it and destroy it. And sure
enough, when they went and investigated the remains of the explosion, it was a mine that
had been rigged to explode remotely. So, that was my "welcome to Iraq" moment.
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MH: Did you ever interact with any unilateral journalists during your experiences
in Iraq?
JR: Let's see. I think I did, briefly. I crossed a few paths with a few of them - a Yahoo!
reporter who was doing multimedia, and I met him in southern Iraq. And then there was a
New York Times reporter. And then, in Mosul- who I don't think she was necessarily
embedded with a specific unit, since reporters can jump around. They can be in embed
from one unit to the next, so the term "unilateral," I guess, is subjective. There's
certainly, I'm sure, reporters that are never embedded - maybe they go around from place
to place. But there are others that I guess the ones that I'm talking to, I'm talking about
would be more folks that are maybe leapfrogging from one unit to the next. Those are the
folks that I'd run into, but mostly I would tell you that the journalists I've interacted with
in Iraq were embedded.

MH: Did military officials ever disallow you from printing information?
JR: No. There are certain rules that you abide by as an embedded journalist. In fact,
there's a printed document that you're presented with by the military before you embed
with a unit that lays the ground rules. And any of the other journalists I'm sure you've
talked to may have mentioned them or were asked to sign this document. These things are
practical rules that I would abide by regardless of the military asking me to abide by
them. These are ones such as not disclosing when an upcoming mission would take place,
or exactly where the precise troop strength of a unit that's about to undertake a mission things that would jeopardize the safety or lives of the soldiers. But I never had, any time,
somebody in the military telling me I could not print something before I was about to do
so.

MH: My next question was geared to reporters whom I didn't really check into - I
didn't know a whole lot about their background in Iraq, but as I looked about you, I
found that you were connected with an incident that had a certain amount of
notoriety. Were you ever concerned for your safety over there in Iraq?
JR: Which incident are you referring to?

MH: I believe it's the one where the rocket hit the mess tent, I think.
JR: Well, in that case, that was December of 2004. A suicide bomber had walked into the
mess tent and exploded his bomb vest that he was wearing, and it killed, you know, more
than a dozen people and wounded close to 70. And certainly at that moment I was afraid
for my safety. That was a pretty intense moment that was only - it only happened several
days after I had arrived, you know. So that would have probably been my second
"welcome to Iraq" moment. But, you know, over the course of my reporting in Iraq, that
was probably the most significant close call that I had, because that bomb exploded about
50 paces from where I was standing. I had -let's see - been through five convoys that
had been attacked with improvised explosive devices, including one that hit the vehicle I
was riding in. I had been in a mortar attack, where rounds were landing near the
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photographer and I, maybe 20 meters away. Let's see. A rocket-propelled grenade went
over the base - that was another instance. Those are some of the ones that come to mind,
but yeah, certainly - during my reporting, I've been afraid for my safety.

MH: Sounds like you've got hit - well, not hit, but just experienced that safety
concern a lot more than most.
JR: I think that the soldiers have experienced, you know, far more than what I have gone
through in my brief time there. But I could tell you probably any journalist that's been
there for as long as I have or more has probably experienced as many if not more
incidents like that. It's a pretty chaotic country with some incredibly dangerous areas,
even for the military.

MH: Did you ever have any concerns about maintaining professionalism?
JR: Elaborate on your question.

MH: Professionalism in the sense of journalistic integrity and the professional
atmosphere that you carried about with you as a reporter. For example, Charlie
Brennan alluded to a time where military officials that he trained under had
instructed him to not hold any weapons, that he was a non-combatant. And yet,
during some times when the situation got a little intense, he was instructed by
members of the military who hadn't had the same briefing, or what have you, to
give him a sidearm. And he refused, because he had already been told that, "No,
you're a non-combatant. You can't - you can't do this." So situations like that that
might have compromised your professional demeanor. Did you ... ?
JR: I understand - yeah. The situation that he's describing, I had that same - same
situation offered several times by soldiers. They're well-meaning, and they just don't
know that we're non-combatants. We're not allowed to carry arms as embedded
journalists or, really, as journalists covering a conflict like that. But there was one - I can
remember distinctly where I was embedded with that Engineer unit from Virginia and we
were traveling across country from Mosul to Kuwait, and I was in the back of a five-ton
truck and the two - there was a private first class and a specialist in the back with me, and
they offered me an M-16 in case things got bad. But, you know, I refused, and it wouldn't
be something that I would reach for. However, if it came down to it and my life was in
danger or the lives of other soldiers were in danger and there was no alternative, I would
defend myself.

MH: Did you ever deliberately hold back information due to your concerns about
your closeness with the troops?
JR: Well, insofar as it related to the embed rules, yes - like disclosing an upcoming
mission; force protection, which means the fortifications around a base, in other words,
how bases are protected - that you wouldn't disclose things like that to the media.
Because I remember, we were reporting on after the effects of the suicide bombing in
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Mosul. We're interested in reporting on just how strong the defenses are of the base and
what th~ soldiers go through in protecting the perimeter of the base, because this suicide
bomber had somehow - had gotten onto the base. So, I remember at that time, we went
up in a guard tower and interviewed soldiers that were on guard duty at least on two
different locations, and I don't know that I would consciously hold back things at the
time about specific things that were being used to protect the base, but I know under the
circumstances that you wouldn't reveal, for instance, that they had a 50-caliber machine
gun or a Bravo 240 machine gun at a specific location on the edge of the base, or how
many soldiers were at that location guarding that entrance. Those are things you just
wouldn't - wouldn't reveal. So, in those instances you would be more general or perhaps
vague, while still be able to get your point across and tell the story, you know, accurately
and comprehensively.

MH: Maybe my next couple questions will help clarify just what I was intending
with that question. Did you ever get a sense of commonality or brotherhood with the
troops during your stay?
JR: Celtainly. Yeah, many times.

MH: Do you think you can describe one or two anecdotes of that?
JR: Yeah. There was a Puerto Rican National Guard unit that was attached to the brigade
I was embedded with from Georgia, and they were very friendly. There was a real
brotherhood among them, and after going out on a mission with them, I remember they
invited us to their tent and they cooked a traditional Puerto Rican meal. I think it was
like, you know, rice and beans and some type of stew. And there's essentially, you know,
a real, you know - certainly some type of bond that, you know, goes on between them,
but also, you know, between us and them. The photographer who was with me at the
time, I remember remarking just how pleasant the experience was.

MH: In what way was your objectivity affected by your proximity to military units,
if at all?
JR: I would say none. I didn't have that problem that I can recall.

MH: Good. So you were able to pretty much report on anything and everything, like
aside from the agreement you'd already signed, where you were pretty much
unrestricted?
JR: Well, I mean you - there are certain restrictions you can imagine. Geographic, one. I
mean, you - you go where the military goes, you know. You don't have the freedom to
leave the base and sort of walk into town. You wouldn't want to, because of the fear of
being captured, but you're restricted in that regard. Unilateral journalists, as you call
them, don't have that same constraint.
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MH: Uh-huh. But I've found in my research that there's sort of a trade-off between
the embed and the unilateral. Whereas the unilateral is able to interview a number
of other sources like Iraqi units and maybe citizens or members of the government,
but he or she of that unilateral bent can't be on the front lines like you guys can.
JR: Right, there are tradeoffs. You're right. And let me give you an example of what you
face as an embedded journalist. You have, you know, tremendous access in many ways to
interviewing soldiers that you're embedded with. But it is certainly difficult to interviews
Iraqis in the country, in the cities, unless you're out with those military units. But the
challenge you face is, they - you're going where the military is going. So you have
certain options to interview just your average-day Iraqis on these missions, but the - if
you don't speak Arabic, as I don't, you rely on military translators. So you're - there's,
you know, first, you know, there's the Iraqi perceiving you with military, so you have
that perception, but also you're being filtered by a translator. So, you know, several steps
that you're going to, to get - to get those interviews that are done. So unilateral
journalists perhaps wouldn't have those challenges that we have. They can have their
own interpreter, you know, they can - if they speak Arabic, that's a benefit. So, you see
what I'm - you see what I'm saying?

MH: Yes sir. That's an interesting aspect to the unilateral versus embed debate that
I hadn't considered.
JR: Well, put yourself in the Iraqi's shoes too. If you have a journalist coming up to you
who's surrounded with soldiers with body armor and guns, maybe that would color how
you answer questions to an embedded journalist.

MH: (laughs) Yeah, I guess it would. Okay. Last question. Did your own emotions
or experiences ever figure into how you covered a particular story?
JR: Yeah, I think it was - it highlighted my sensitivity to, you know, being sensitive in
my reporting, pmiicularly in cases where I was reporting on, you know fatalities. That
made me more, I hope, conscientious about what is fair and accurate and balanced things we would normally do as journalists, but also just sensitive to families back home
and the fellow soldiers. You need to report what exactly happened, but at the same time
kind of be sensitive to those around you. In the mess test bombing, for instance, you
know, there was two that had been killed from the unit I was embedded with, and you're
very awm"e and conscious of that, because the soldiers that you're aware of, you know,
just lost two of their friends. So, it can be a trying circumstance for a journalist to
maintain that balance, when you want to interview other soldiers about what just, what
happened. You have to walk very carefully and very cautiously into a situation. They're
angry, understandably very upset, so in some cases you just - you give them some time
before you approach them. And when you do approach them, you're very respectful and
you, you know - it's not, it's a very difficult balancing act, but, you know, you do your
best in those situations. But celiainly, it heightens your sensitivity.
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MH: Do you have any final comments, questions, observations about the embed
process from your experience?
JR: No. Ijust had a very successful time. I learned a lot. I think it made me a much better
drawer in the experience, and they're memories that I'll have for the rest of my life, so,
you know, it was a very fulfilling, life-changing experience for me.

MH: Is it one you'd do again in a heartbeat?
JR: I would. Yeah, I would - if the opportunity presents itself. I certainly would.
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Interview 5: Lou Hansen, The Virginian-Pilot

MH: Yeah, thank you for agreeing to do this. Okay, first question. How long was
your stay in Iraq?
LH: My stay in - well, we actually went to a couple different places. We went to the 5th
Fleet in the Persian Gulf with the Navy and to Kuwait. And we got to the border of Iraq,
but we did not get into Iraq. The stay lasted 17 or 18 days.

MH: Okay. Probably one of the shorter trips I've heard. I interviewed Jeremy
Redmon of the Atlanta Journal-Constitution. He went three times for a combined
five months. But that's okay.
LH: Yeah, that's a long haul.

MH: Okay, second question. You were embedded with which unit again?
LH: I was embedded with the - with several units. I was aboard the aircraft canier Teddy
Roosevelt, the destroyer San Jacinto, and I was on the ground embedded with a Navy
logistics support team. They're basically customs agents and cargo haulers.

MH: What was your "welcome to Iraq" moment?
LH: It was - gosh, there were several. I went out to - well, we went out to an oil platform
in the Persian Gulf. It's where about - there are two basic oil terminals that Iraq uses to
ship its oil, and it's where tankers pull up, supertankers pull up and fill. Well, we board
this tanker in the middle of the Gulf and got to meet the Iraqi navy - and these guys were
incredibly friendly and seemed to enjoy working side by side with the - with the military,
the U.S. military. But at the same time, they were just clearly from two very different
worlds. The Iraqis were loosey-goosey - They couldn't, you know, hold formation in a
muster. One of them dropped their AK-4 7, you know, while they were mustered and, you
know, being addressed by their commanding officer. The U.S. sailors were, you know,
ramrod-straight, you know, armed to the - to the teeth and, you know, with full protective
gear. It was that - it was that kind of moment that I said, "Wow. You know, here are two
very different cultures." The other moment really came when we went to the sterilization
or - I forgot what it was called. It was basically the yards where they sent battle-damaged
vehicles, Humvees, tanks and other combat vehicles. And we literally saw hundreds upon
hundreds upon hundreds of vehicles just in all sorts of ways blown up. And you could you really got a feel for the toll and the scope of the war at that moment. It was like lining
up-oh, I don't know - ten car dealerships in the middle of the desert, and it was, you
know - and every single one was either shot through with small-arms fire or RPG rounds
or IEDs. And we were told that, you know, certain vehicles, when they had a red spot
spray-painted on their windshield, was where someone was - had been killed. So you
saw, you know, these vast fields and these vast lots with all these vehicles with the red
dots on them, and, you know, you couldn't help but see the human toll that this was
taking.
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MH: I imagine that it really brought - brought it home for you because of the, like
you said, the tangible way you could see that loss of life.
LH: 1-

MH: Were you going to say something else?
LH: No. It was - it was just, you know, it's what we did. We saw an - an arms-length
view of the war. So we weren't in the inner ring, but we were in the next-to-inner ring.
And it was still much more than - than I could have imagined, reporting on this war. I'm
a military reporter here in Virginia, and it was, you know, it made it many times more
real.

MH: Did you interact with any unilateral journalists?
LH:No.

MH: Good! You - that's four out of the five responses that I got was a "no" or a
"not really."
LH: Yeah. We, we - yeah. Yeah. We were at - we were at larger bases, so I don't think
too many unilaterals would have been - been coming around.

MH: Did military officials ever disallow you from printing information?
LH: Well, I think, Matthew - I mean, I don't know if you probably - if you, if you saw
the stories that I wrote and my colleague Leo Kim photographed. We did get in trouble
with the military. We were allowed to - to go places that we needed to go with an escort,
and we were always escorted. But there was one story that we did about battle-damaged
vehicles that - that, you know, I thought tried to convey what the, what the - what the
cost was of the war and what the sailors were, were having to deal with on a daily basis what that was like in Kuwait. And the, the story showed battle-damaged Humvees and
described in some detail the - you know, the mess that was, that was inside one vehicle.
That was published on a Saturday, and on a Monday the - one of our escorts came and with a sidearm on - and took our press passes and told us we were going to be kicked off
base and had lost our reporting privileges. So, you know, at that point we were, you
know, we were pretty much done reporting. It was at the end of the trip, so, you know the Army never prevented - well- the Army prevented us from having access to things.
So, they don't censor - they didn't censor anything before the fact. If we asked about
things and they didn't want to show them to us, they just said, "No, you can't go there."
So, they - they show you what they want to show you for the most part, and then you
have to work around their agenda. I mean, it's - it's, you know, it's their base. It's theirit's their unit. It's their people. So you have to play by their rules. So, it was - you know,
it was difficult, though. I mean, we - we were kicked out. We had permission to do
everything that we did, and we were escorted. We weren't snealdng around. We told
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everyone that we wanted to - what the story said we were going to do and we told
everyone that we were a reporter and a photographer. But, you know, the story just upset
the Army in particular. And we had signed an agreement at the beginning of the - well,
actually, when we landed at the base. We were never told that we had to sign an
embedding agreement beforehand, but - but they, you know, got us there and, and had us
sign this - this long document that said, basically, you know, there are about 40 different
things that you couldn't do. And basically, almost any of the reporting that we did there,
they - they probably could have fault, found fault with and evicted us if they didn't like
it. So, essentially that's what happened. They didn't like a story and they - and they
evicted us. So -

MH: On a side note, would it be possible for me to procure a copy of that document
for my report, or is that pretty much military property?
LH: You know, I probably have a copy of it around. And the - the clause that said, the
one - it was, it was actually an addendum, I believe. It was "no pictures of battledamaged vehicles." And, you know .... (laughs) When we were told, you know, thisthis trip was presented to us, and it was, you know, it was something that was ananged by
the Navy. We were told that, "These are the jobs that - that the men you're covering will
be doing. They're going to be customs agents that screen people before they leave the
country, leave the war and go back to the United States. And they're going to be cleaning
up the vehicles that - that have been damaged, and they're going to be going back to the
United States." So you know, on that basis, you know, we said, "Okay," you know. It's
not the sexiest story in the world, but - but we'll go and we'll do it. So, you know, I
think, you know - you know, the broader point - it comes down to the negotiations, when
you talked about rep0l1ing. A lot of times, it's, you know, "Can we go here? Can we talk
to this person? This is a story that we'd like to tell." And then, the military will counter
with, "Well, that's a little sensitive. We can't have you do that." Well, what we ended up
getting were - were mixed messages. We - we, you know, which probably results
because, you know, it's - one, it's an Army base, and we were with, you know, Navy
public affairs officials. But, you know, the Army said, you know, "You can't - you can't
do any of this stuff." And yet, they knew we were going to all these places, that that's all
there was to do. So, we always asked permission before we took photos and before we
talked to people, so - yeah, you know. I mean, it was just - just, you know, ended up
being a miscommunication between the two.

MH: Were you ever concerned for your safety?
LH: (laughs) You know, Matthew, they were going to kick us out. They - they said, "Get
your stuff ready and be ready to - to go into Kuwait City. You're done - we're not going
to take care of you anymore." And, yeah, I mean they - the reserve commander came in
and evicted us - and wagged his finger in my face. He was armed, and he said, you know,
"Don't make me be an asshole." And I said, "Look. I mean, I just want to explain what
we're doing and why we're doing what we, we did." If we went into Kuwait City, it
would have been - yes, it could have been dangerous. No Navy personnel are allowed
into Kuwait City without being armed and without, you know, going in teams of at least
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two. We were told that there were al-Qaida elements in Kuwait City and that it's a
dangerous place to be. And that's where they were going to drop us. So yeah, we were a
little concerned. And, you know, and that lasted for about, you know, 24 hours. But
honestly, I mean, that's a small worry compared with guys who are really embedding
with, say, the Marines in Fallujah, you know. Ours was just on a scale many times less many, many times less. But, you know, I'd like to go back and embed this summer. So,
hopefully I'll have the 0ppOliunity to do that - be, be, be in h-aq with, with combat - with
combat units. So -

MH: Did you ever have any concerns about maintaining professionalism?
LH: You know, I - no. I don't - I don't think I was compromised at all. We - we wrote,
you know, probably a, you know, a front page story every other day on the average. So,
we got our work done, and I think we had good relationships with the public affairs
officials for the most part. You know, it's a great experience, because you get to spend a
lot of time with, with the soldiers and sailors and Marines who are actually doing the
work. It's non-scripted. It's just a real immersion into - into a person's life. And I, I think
if you're a good reporter - the best repOliers will, will find out more about a person than
that person's husband or wife or child will ever know about their experiences at war. And
I think that's - I think that's important for, you know, for the guys and for the men and
women over there doing the job. I think they need to tell their story. I think in some ways,
it's kind of - it's kind of cathartic. So I think that's kind of how I feel my, my
professional role is. It's - it's to tell stories, and I think then, getting close to the subjects,
I can remain in a professional way. And it benefits both of us, you know, on the bestyou know, on the best of - you know, the best circumstances.

MH: Speaking of which, did you ever deliberately hold back information due to
concerns about your closeness with the troops?
LH: There wasn't anything that - that required us to be, you know, that sensitive about,
about operational security. In fact, I mean, there - there were things, yeah. We, we were
told not to photograph certain landmarks on the base, and we did not photograph them
and did not publish them. We were told not to give, you know, exact descriptions of
where Camp Arifjan was, and these other, these other outlying camps were, on the h-aqi
border. And we didn't identify those either. So, yeah, there - there are security concerns
as far as locations of, of these support bases. And, and - we certainly, we certainly abided
by that. And the other thing we did, we were told not to photograph the h-aqi navy with
their - we were told to photograph them from behind, not show their faces, because it
might jeopardize them. And, and we - we abided by that. I mean, the last thing you want
to do is, is to be, you know, responsible for, for some, some guy who's malcing - you
know, doing a very risky job, could cost him his life if he gets identified. So yeah, I
mean, those were, were kind of security concerns that we worked around.

MH: Did you ever get a sense of commonality or brotherhood with the troops
during your stay?
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LH: Yeah, absolutely. I mean - (laughs) you know, one of the, one of the units happened
to be from upstate New York, near my hometown in Rochester. And a bunch of guys,
you know - I didn't know it at the time, but I probably played baseball against them in
high school. So, yeah, we did. I mean, we paddled around, we joked. You can't get beer,
there, but you know, I imagine - I imagine we would have. I thought we had - yeah, I
thought we had, you know, good relations and, yeah. I mean, there is a sympathy that that, you know, develops between these guys. Yeah. I mean, it was just - it was a short
stay. I mean, I can't say that there's any fast friendships that we made, but if you spend
even ten hours around someone and you're always asking them questions, you, you can't
help but build a bond.

MH: In what way was your objectivity affected by your proximity to military units,
if at all?
.
LH: I - I don't think there, there was. I mean, I - I don't think there was any real loss of
objectivity. I don't think I was - I mean, I think I developed good relationships, but I
don't think my reporting or - or, you know, photo - you know, photographs or
photographers' images reflected, reflected any - any bias or lack of objectivity.

MH: Final question. Did your own emotions or experiences ever figure into how you
covered a particular story?
LH: Yeah. I think the best stories are driven by emotions and things that interest - that
interest you and, and strike you most powerfully. Seeing the battle-damaged Humvees
and hearing the story of, you know, five young Marines being incinerated in the back of a
- of a light -armored vehicle. That was a very moving moment. I mean, it was almost, you
know - I was hearing a story. This story, we - we were at this, this LAV that was in this,
you know, in this yard. And this - two sailors were talking in hushed tones, almost like
you, you were at church. And we didn't say anything. I - Ijust, you know, uh, you know,
just followed them around and listened and - yeah. I mean, it was - it was an emotional
time to realize that, that five young men had been killed, you know, in this - in this very
spot. Yeah. I think the best stories are - are fueled by that, by that emotion. And, you
know, you know, you - you can be objective and be passionate at the same time. I mean,
you can see - you can see all sides of an issue, I think, and be passionate about telling its
story. At the same time, I don't think there's a conflict there.

MH: Any final remarks, comments, thoughts about the embed process?
LH: Well, it's like any other relationship between a reporter and his source. It has to be
developed by - trust is the, is the best thing to have. It's - it's a wonderful- any, any
reporter who's embedded will tell, will probably tell you that it's one of the best - it's
one of the best reporting experiences of their careers. You, you really immerse yourself in
a subject. And it's - it's really the best way to understand what the - the military is
actually doing. And for a mid-sized paper like the Virginian-Pilot - we have a circulation
of about 200,000, and it's you know, the largest in Virginia - but, you know, it, it really
tells the story. If, if a reporter embeds, he can really bring home this big story in a very
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personal way to the readers and the people of that city, and - and that's tremendously
important. That's - you know, you, you - you can't put a value on it, because it, it - it's,
it's such a complicated and difficult issue to wrestle with, that you really need that lens.
And I, I wish that, you know, more reporters from more papers could, could go over and
- and do that, and, and tell those local stories. I think it's just vital for informing the
people ... of the work that these young men and women are doing.

